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Summary 
The U.S. system of security law was designed more than 70 years ago to regain investors’ 
trust after a major financial crisis. Today we face a similar problem. But while in the 1930s 
the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious 
quality securities, in the new millennium, investors’ perception is that they have been 
defrauded by managers who are not accountable to anyone. For this reason, I propose a 
series of reforms that center around corporate governance, while shifting the focus from the 
protection of unsophisticated investors in the purchasing of new securities issues to the 
investment in mutual funds, pension funds, and other forms of asset management. 
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  The backbone of U.S. security law was introduced in the 1930s to restore the 
public’s trust in securities market, which had been undermined by the excesses of the 
1920s and the crash of 1929 and the early 1930s. The intellectual foundation of this 
legislation, inspired by the work of Louis Brandeis and written mostly by James Landis, 
was the protection of small investors against the abuses perpetrated by knowledgeable 
insiders in the issuance and the trading of securities.   
  Seventy-five years later, we face a similar problem trying to restore trust in 
securities market, but starting from very different initial conditions. The fundamental 
trust problem we are facing today is not the result of offering “speculative schemes which 
have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'” (Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 
539 (1917)), but of frauds and mistakes committed by managers who are accountable to 
none.  The 2007-08 financial crisis is perceived as a manifestation of excessive risk 
taking by managers who were enriching themselves via short-term bonuses, while 
destroying the long-term value of their companies (ACCA, 2008). The stunning collapse 
of major financial institutions is perceived as a lack of proper risk management and 
accountability by corporate boards (Minow, 2008).  
  Furthermore, the increase in institutional ownership, from less than 10% in the 
1930s to more than 70% today, shifts the focus from the protection of unsophisticated 
investors vis-à-vis the underwriting of securities to the investment in mutual funds, 
pension funds, and other forms of asset management.   
Finally, the massive increase in the use of financial markets for retirement 
purposes has made the securities market much more important politically.  In 1975, the 
value of privately-held pension assets represented only 18% of the GDP and 70% was 
represented by defined benefit plans, which did not directly expose workers to financial 
market risk; today, pension assets represent 60% of the GDP, 70% of which is in defined 
contribution plans and thus exposed to financial market risk. As a result, the efficiency of 
individual investment choices and the costs they bear is not just an issue of fairness, but a 
primary public finance consideration. Without wise investments, the vast majority of 
Americans will not have enough to support themselves in retirement.  
 What is the appropriate security regulation for this changed world? To answer 
this question I start by reviewing the theoretical role for regulation: why and when   3
competition in the marketplace is insufficient in protecting investors. I then compare the 
theoretical predictions with the experience of unregulated markets and their relative 
successes and failures.   
From this analysis, I derive three main areas of intervention. First, a reform of 
corporate governance aimed at empowering institutional investors to nominate their own 
directors to the board. This reform will make it worthwhile for directors to develop a 
reputation of acting in the interest of shareholders and hence to make corporate managers 
accountable. However, to minimize the risk that institutional investors pursue a self-
interested agenda, institutional investors should be themselves independent. To achieve 
this goal, I propose a new Glass-Steagall Act, which instead of separating commercial 
and investment banking will separate mutual fund management from investment and 
commercial banking.   
The second goal should be the protection of unsophisticated individuals with 
regard to their investments. The minimum this protection entails is enhanced disclosure. 
At the time of purchase, investors should be provided with a dollar estimate of all the 
expenses that will be charged to their investment, including the amount paid in trading 
commissions, itemized as commissions paid for trading and those paid for services. 
Similarly, at the time of the purchase, brokers should disclose the fee they receive on the 
different products they sell, including the “soft dollar” they receive in the form of higher 
trading costs. The same strict standards should apply to both brokerage accounts and 
money management accounts.  
Yet, given the importance of this industry to the retirement of most Americans, 
simple disclosure might not be sufficient. Therefore, regulation should encourage 
competition by restricting practices that take advantage of individual’s gullibility, such as 
teaser rates in flexible rate mortgages.   
The third goal should be that of reducing the regulatory gap between public 
markets and private markets. The recent trend of migration from the former to the latter 
suggests that this differential is excessive. This migration should be stopped not only by 
deregulating the public market, but also by introducing some disclosure standards in the 
private one. In the public market, the empowerment of institutional investors will make it 
possible to transform some of the mandatory regulation into optional rules, following the   4
British comply-or-explain system. On the private market front, there are compelling 
reasons to mandate a delayed disclosure provision in which private companies and 
unregistered funds report information and performance with a 1 to 2 year delay. This 
delay has the benefit of reducing the competitive cost of disclosure, while at the same 
time allowing for a serious statistical analysis of this market, which will improve 
allocation of savings.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 summarizes the theoretical 
justification for regulation. Section 2 describes the major trends in security markets since 
the passage of the 1930s security laws. Section 3 tries to assess the efficiency of the 
markets that have been exempt from security regulation vis-à-vis those regulated. 
Sections 4, 5, and 6 outline the road map for reform of security regulations that 
incorporate the new demand for protection in a changed environment.  
 
1. Why do we need regulation?  
Since the 1930s, financial economics has made significant progress in analyzing when 
regulation is needed because the necessary protections are not be offered by the market. 
In what follows, I provide a brief review of the strongest arguments in favor of 
regulation. Of course, these benefits are not achieved without significant costs, which 
will be considered when we look at the empirical evidence.  
1.1 Disclosure 
A very comprehensive analysis of the theory and evidence on the effect of corporate 
disclosure is contained in Leuz and Wysocki (2008). In what follows, I touch on only 
some of the most important points.   
Grossman and Hart (1980) show that a firm will voluntarily disclose all its 
information if, and only if, three assumptions are satisfied: 1) investors know that firms 
have that information (for example, they know it has collected the level of revenues for 
that year); 2) firms cannot lie (albeit they can refuse to disclose their information); 3) 
disclosure is costless.  
If one of these assumptions is violated, voluntary disclosure will be less than 
complete. Hence, there is a basis to argue in favor of mandatory disclosure. Grossman 
and Hart’s (1980) result only shows that in presence of disclosure costs, firms will not   5
fully reveal their information. Whether it is optimal to force them to disclose depends 
very much on the source of these disclosure costs and their magnitude with regard to the 
benefits of disclosure.  
  If the costs are simply the clerical costs of disclosing, then the analysis boils down 
to a comparison between the magnitude of these cost and the benefits of disclosure. Since 
information has a public good component, we can expect that in general, firms will 
provide less disclosure than is socially optimal. While firms internalize the benefits they 
can derive from disclosure, they will not internalize the full value of social benefits. 
General Motor’s disclosure helps investors evaluate Ford, but GM will never internalize 
this benefit. Given the falling clerical cost of disclosure and its great potential benefit, it 
is easy to make the case for mandatory disclosure.     
  The case is more complex if we consider other disclosure costs such as the 
dissemination of proprietary information, which might hurt a firm’s competitive position. 
In the presence of these costs, firms will not fully reveal their information, but it is far 
from clear (from a social welfare point of view) whether they should. While a 
hypothetical social planner does not internalize the competitive position of each 
individual firm, he does internalize the incentive to invest in R&D. If mandatory 
disclosure discourages R&D investments, it is clearly not socially desirable.  
  An additional argument in favor of mandatory disclosure is based on the superior 
enforcement power of this approach. While a regulatory authority can more easily verify 
the veracity of the numbers disclosed, a private intermediary can only do so by filing a 
lawsuit, an avenue which is very slow and expensive.    
  Even when firms reveal all relevant information in a truthful manner, an argument 
in favor of regulation can be built on the timing of this revelation. When the timing of the 
release matters (as is the case in financial markets), firms can trade early access to 
information in exchange for some other favors. For example, before the introduction of 
“full disclosure” regulation, U.S. firms were allowed to announce their earnings in a 
conference call with few analysts of their choosing. Since the chosen analysts benefit 
from this position, there is a significant risk they will repay the privilege by providing 
favorable future earnings forecasts for the firm.    6
  The same incestuous “quid pro quo” can occur between journalists and firms. The 
fewer public sources available, the more a journalist will depend on privileged access to 
write good stories. Firms, then, will tend to concede or withdraw that access depending 
on the spin of the articles written by a certain journalist or newspaper. For example, the 
Financial Times correspondent from California lamented at a conference that Hewlett 
Packard was routinely excluding him from the interviews released by Carly Fiorina 
because of his previous negative articles about her.  Consistent with this claim,  Dyck and 
Zingales (2003) show that newspapers’ report of earnings are more biased towards 
companies when journalists have less access to source of information alternative to the 
company itself.       
   Hence, regulation that controls the timing of and the access to information can 
improve the objectivity of analysts and journalists, contributing to the credibility of the 
financial system as a whole.  
 
1.2 Standardization Issues  
             A more subtle benefit of regulation in the disclosure arena is the standardization 
it entails. Even assuming that firms cannot lie in their disclosure, they have several 
different ways to present the evidence. Each firm will naturally choose the format that is 
the most favorable to its data, impairing investors’ ability to make comparisons across 
firms. For example, in the unregulated U.S. private equity industry, funds disclose their 
performance in terms of internal rate of return (IRR) of their portfolio, but there are 
different ways to aggregate the IRR of individual investments into the IRR of a portfolio. 
These methods lead to significantly different results, depending on the timing of the more 
successful investments. By making a direct comparison among funds more difficult, these 
differences in standards impair the process of capital allocation toward the more talented 
managers. Interestingly, this problem persists in spite of the relative sophistication of the 
players in this industry (endowments, pension funds, and very wealthy individuals). The 
reason is that each investor gets only a small benefit from a more standardized disclosure, 
which makes private equity funds or hedge funds more comparable: the greater benefit 
(i.e., comparability) accrues to all market participants, regardless of their effort in 
pressuring the funds to disclose more. Thus, everybody prefers to use their bargaining   7
power to extract other concessions from the funds, leading to a suboptimal level of 
standardization.      
 
1.3 Systemic Considerations 
While liquidity issues do not necessarily belong to the realm of security regulation, there 
are both historical and practical reasons to include them. First of all, the 1933 Securities 
Act gives authority to the Federal Reserve to fix the level of collateral for security 
purchases on margin. In so doing, it makes margin requirements part of security 
regulation. Second, liquidity greatly affects the functioning of the security markets and 
thus cannot be ignored when it comes to regulation aimed at improving the functioning of 
these markets. In what follows, I analyze the three main reasons why there is some basis 
for government intervention in the realm of liquidity. 
 
1.3.1 Liquidity Externalities 
When individual firms choose their financing they take for granted the level of 
liquidity of the market. But, as Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997) show, in a world where firms are wealth-constrained, the liquidity of the market 
depends on firms’ financial structure. The more in debt firms are, the less able they are to 
bid for existing assets and the less liquid the market is. In such a world, small shocks to 
fundamentals can cause a vicious circle: with drops in prices, which cause defaults, 
which in turn cause drops in prices, and so on.  
Anticipating this problem, some firms would find it prudent to remain liquid 
(and/or with low leverage) to take advantage of these market downturns and buy assets at 
fire sale prices. However, there are two reasons, why this private provision of liquidity 
might not be sufficient. First, by keeping a reserve of liquidity, a firm generates a positive 
externality in all its industry (a higher price of assets in case of a downturn). This 
externality is not fully captured by the firm maintaining the liquidity and thus there will 
be underprovision of liquidity. The second reason, which applies in particular to the 
banking industry, regards the ex ante effects of the expectation of some form of 
government help and/or relief in a downturn. By alleviating the drop in prices, such   8
interventions would reduce the return of keeping a reserve of liquidity. The mere 
expectation of this possibility can cause an underprovision of liquidity.    
 
1.3.2  Imperfect commitment in the provision of insurance   
A related, but different, justification for regulation is provided by Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1998).  In the presence of aggregate uncertainty they show that the private sector fails to 
provide sufficient liquidity because it cannot fully insure against the aggregate shock: 
each private firm could default, destroying the value of the insurance it provides. The 
government can obviate this problem because it has the ability to offer claims against 
future labor income.   
 
1.3.3 Too big to fail  
Another classic justification for ex ante regulation is as a means to reduce the moral 
hazard created by ex post intervention. If certain financial institutions are too big (i.e., too 
important to the national economy) to be allowed to fail, then the moral hazard ex ante is 
very pronounced and needs to be mitigated by some form of regulation.   
 
1.4 Unsophisticated Investors      
The word ‘credit’ comes from the Latin credere, which means to trust. If trust, as Arrow 
(1972) states, is essential to any economic activity, it is particularly important in 
financing. Following Guiso et al. (2008), we can consider trust as the posterior beliefs 
about the integrity of the system. Such a belief comes in part from the observed data, but 
in part from people’s priors. Generic trust towards other people can predict the trust 
towards the stock market and the investment in the stock market (Guiso et al. (2008)). To 
the extent that government intervention can affect this level of generalized trust, it can 
improve stock market participation. 
 
1.4.1 Psychological arguments  
  One way a government can affect people’s trust is through a rigorous enforcement 
of existing rules. We know from psychology that salient events tend to weight heavily in 
people’s mind. Thus, while highly publicized individual cases of fraud can have a   9
negative effect on trust, highly publicized cases of enforcement can have a positive 
effect. In a cross-section of countries, Aghion et al. (2008) show that higher mistrust 
leads to a higher demand for government intervention. But a similar relationship also 
exists in the time series.  After every major crisis, the demand for government 
intervention increases. For example, after the 1929 crisis, there was a large demand for 
intervention. The same is true after the Enron and WorldCom scandals. And the same is 
true today.  Lack of intervention is perceived as indifference, while some intervention can 
engender hope that the system will improve and so raise the level of trust. It is hard to 
prove causality, but the passage of Sarbanes Oxley was followed by an increase in the 
general trust towards the stock market (Hochberg et al., 2009).  
  Besides these psychological arguments for regulation, there are also several 
economic reasons why the presence of unsophisticated investors should lead to some 
form of regulation.  
 
1.4.2 Too many to fail  
In a democratic society, when many people make the same mistake, the temptation to 
change the rules ex post and help them out becomes irresistible. We have witnessed this 
problem during the 2008 presidential race, where the candidates started to compete for 
more and aggressive bailouts to aid banks and home owners.  Once an issue becomes a 
national problem, it is impossible for the political system not to intervene and the 
anticipation of this intervention creates a serious moral hazard problem, which can be 
limited only by some ex ante regulation.    
 
1.4.3 Deviation from Rationality  
Thus far, we have maintained the assumption, standard in the economic literature, 
that economic agents are rational and make choices that maximize their own welfare, but 
a growing body of research, however, has challenged this assumption. Mandrian and 
Shea (2001), for instance, show that people are much more likely to participate in a 
retirement plan when the default rule is that they are enrolled rather than when the default 
rule is that they are not enrolled, even if they are free to switch. Given the life altering 
effect of this decision, it is hard to rationalize the effect of such a tiny shift in the cost of   10
the decision.  
  Using this evidence, Thaler and Sustein (2003) argue in favor of a strategic choice 
of default options aimed at maximizing social welfare. If these options are simply a 
default, which the parties involved can change at no cost, their strategy comes at no real 
cost to individual freedom.  For this reason, they label it “libertarian paternalism”.  
Surprisingly enough, even this very bland form of paternalism seems to impact final 
outcomes (Thaler and Bernartzi (2003)).  
 
1.4.4 Directing competition  
  An interesting question, which these authors do not address, is how far do you 
want to push this paternalism. Default rules, for instance, have an enormous effect in 
framing competition among firms, especially in markets with high search cost. Consider a 
regulation requiring mutual funds to report the total amount of fees charged to investors 
on the first page of their prospectuses. Even if funds can opt out of this rule at no cost, 
this type of disclosure is likely to make fees salient to investors, forcing funds to compete 
along this dimension. Which dimension should the regulator choose to emphasize? While 
it is probably safe to assume that the goal of a regulator should be to maximize 
competition because competition is welfare enhancing, if competition is multi-
dimensional, it is unclear what dimension a regulator should prefer. And if this problem 
arises when the disclosure form is optional, it becomes even more complex if the 
regulator imposes a fixed disclosure format.  
  In the presence of unsophisticated investors, the scope for regulation can be even 
larger if we consider the possible distortions on competition. Laibson and Gabaix (2006), 
for instance, have a model that shows that when consumers or investors exhibit some 
behavioral bias, competition might not fix it, but exacerbate it. Consider, for instance, 
laser printers: If consumers underestimate the future costs of cartridges, producers have 
an interest in raising this cost. Competition will only have the effect of reducing the 
upfront cost of printers, but not eliminate the distortion that additional cartridges are 
priced above their marginal cost, generating an under consumption of cartridges. It does 
not pay for a producer to change strategy and advertise its lower cost on future cartridges, 
because it would appeal only to the most rational consumers, who are the most price   11
sensitive and the ones who will buy its product only if they consume a lot of cartridges. 
By deviating from the distorted marketing policy, the producer would lose the most 
profitable consumers, without gaining much on the overall number of consumers. It is 
precisely this cross-subsidization from the biased consumers to the rational ones that 
sustains this bad equilibrium.  As Campbell (2006) shows, a similar problem occurs also 
in the mortgage supply market.       
  In this context a regulatory ban on tied sales or on a particular type of mortgage 
can be Pareto improving. For example, if regulation was to prevent teaser rates on 
flexible rate mortgages, it is not obvious what cost it will entail, though it  could improve 
household financing choices as discussed in Campbell (2006). This is a novel 
justification for regulation that is likely to become a very important one in the future.   
 
1.5 Corporate Governance  
In the area of corporate governance, we are so far away from the pure contractualistic 
model that it is pointless to discuss where government intervention could help with 
respect to pure private contracting. It is more relevant to discuss what reforms are needed 
to overcome the current situation, where managers are unaccountable.   
In the current “director centric” regime, shareholders have very little saying. State 
anti-takeover statutes and poison pills have made hostile takeovers all but impossible. 
State competition in corporate law is also of little help, since shareholders have only a 
subordinate vote on reincorporation (they cannot propose a reincorporation, they can only 
vote on one proposed by managers). As a result, Delaware finds it more profitable to 
cater to managers’ interests than to those of the shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  
Finally, shareholders have no say in the choice regarding  the slate of directors standing 
up for election; it is decided by the incumbent board.  In this context, the objective should 
not be how to regulate, but how to reform the current situation in a way to make 
managers more accountable.  
 
1.5. Who Should Regulate     
  Even after we agree on the need for regulation, it remains the question of who 
should regulate. Choi and Guzman (1998), Mahoney (1997) and Romano (1998) all argue   12
in favor of a devolution, a system where the SEC regulatory monopoly is replaced by 
regulatory competition either among U.S. states or across countries. While this 
competition among legislatures, similar to the one prevailing in corporate law, might 
seem appealing, it faces some serious limitations. Since the regulatory regime is chosen 
by the managers and not by shareholders, this choice can be affected by severe agency 
problems. Furthermore, there is a divergence between the optimal and the social choice 
of disclosure due to externalities, i.e., information that would hurt the issuer by helping 
its competitors (Fox, 2001).   
  Most interestingly, Coates (2001) argues that if this devolution was so appealing 
to companies, it would have received a huge amount of lobbying support. In fact, there is 
no evidence in favor of it. Coates explains this by citing the instability of such a 
regulatory regime (which would cost the issuers more than a moderately bad, but stable 
regulatory regime) and with the fact that the main advantage of a competitive system is 
the flexibility it provides in order to fit the needs of different companies. Yet—Coates 
argues—this  flexibility is already present in the United States: all the exemptions to 
regulation created an unregulated private market that provides a great amount of 
flexibility to U.S. companies. I will return on this point momentarily.   
 
2. The Status of Securities Markets    
2.1 Institutionalization  
According to Cox (1963), roughly one million Americans owned stock at the beginning 
of the 20
th century. The success of the Liberty Bonds placement and the aggressive use of 
door-to-door distribution techniques in the aftermath of WWI (Mahoney, 2001), lead to 
an increase in the number of shareholders to 5 million by 1927, equal to roughly 7% of 
the population. The boom at the end of the 1920s’ fueled an acceleration in the diffusion 
of stock ownership, doubling the number of investors. By the 1930s, roughly 14% of 
American households owned equity. As a result, in 1930 90% of publicly traded equity 
was owned by individuals (Hawley and Williams (2000)).  
    By and large, this very rapid diffusion of stock ownership was not driven by the 
realization of the benefits of stock ownership, but by the prospect of rapid enrichment 
triggered by the dramatic surge in stock prices. At a time when 12% of the population   13
was functionally illiterate and 50% had less than an 8th grade education (Bryson (1936)), 
the situation was ripe for abuses. Thus, it is not surprising that several scandals emerged 
like the famous scheme invented by Tom Ponzi (and that to this day still bears his name) 
and the several others that fill the accounts of the 1920s (Thel, 1990).  
  The dramatic decline in stock prices that ensued and the highly publicized Pecora 
Commission Hearings (where the investigation into the alleged abuses was broadcast on 
the radio) created a diffuse climate of mistrust, which lead to a sharp decline in stock 
ownership. As recent neuroeconomics studies suggest (Knutson et al, 2008; Kuhnen and 
Knutson, 2007), the decision to invest in stock has a strong emotional component and this 
component tends to be more important for the less educated people. Guiso et al. (2008), 
for instance, show that the level of trust affects the degree of stock market participation 
only for the less educated people. It follows that a reduction in trust lead to a dramatic 
reduction in stock market participation. This reduction is illustrated by the participation 
numbers of the 1930s-40s; although, there are no good data (that I know of) for the late 
1930s and early 1940s, by 1950 the number of stockholders was only 5 million 
corresponding to 5% of the population. It was to overcome this mistrust that the 
Government decided to intervene. Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act captures the 
congressional view that stock prices reflected the action of speculators and manipulators, 
who took advantage of the gullible (Thel, 1990).   
  In the seventy-five years since the Securities Act, the situation could not have 
changed more. In 1950, more than 90% of U.S. equity was owned directly by households. 
By 2007, this figure has dropped to less than 30% (Figure 1). Most of this share is 
represented by management and insiders, who in the typical company collectively own 
24% of the equity (Holderness, 2007). At the same time, the percentage of U.S. equity 
owned by institutions has risen from less than 10% to more than 60% (Figure 2). If we 
take into consideration that institutions account for more than a proportional share of 
trading, we can assert that almost all of the daily trading in the U.S. stock is done by 
institutions.     
 
2.2 The Rise of Private Security Markets    14
The Securities Act “was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material 
information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors 
against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical 
standards of honesty and fair dealing.”
1 These goals were pursued by making it unlawful 
to offer and sell a security without registering with the SEC. Yet, Congress recognized 
that it was inefficient to require the registration of securities offerings “where the public 
benefits are too remote.”
2  Thus, Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts “transactions 
by an issuer not involving any public offering” from registration.
3 As aptly described by 
Sjostrom (forthcoming), however, Congress did not define what a public offering was.  
This problem was partially resolved by the Supreme Court in the 1953 SEC v. 
Ralston Purina Co. case which established that “a transaction not involving any public 
offering”
4 is “[a]n offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves…”
5 
What the Supreme Court did not clarify, is who are the sophisticated investors “able to 
fend for themselves.”  
This task was, in turn, executed by the SEC, with the definition of “accredited 
investor.” SEC Rule 501(a) defines an “accredited investor” as “[any] natural person 
whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, at the time of his 
purchase exceeds $1,000,000;” “[any] natural person who had an individual income in 
excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that 
person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable 
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year;” and the executive 
officers and directors of the issuer.  
According to SEC Rule 506, an offering is exempted from security regulation if it 
is limited to accredited investors and no more than 35 non-accredited investors. 
Furthermore, each non-accredited investor in the offering has to be sophisticated, i.e., has 
“such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of 
                                                 
1 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933)), cited in Sjostrom (forthcoming).  
2 H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 7, 15-16 (1933).  
3 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2). As adopted in 1933, what is now § 4(2) of the Securities Act 
was the second clause of § 4(1) of the Securities Act. 
4 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 200 F.2d. 85, 93 (8th Cir. 1952). 
5 SEC v. Ralston Purina, 345 U.S. at 127.   15
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,” either in his own right or 
with the aid of one or more “purchaser representatives” (Sjostrom, forthcoming).  
In the last twenty-five years, this exemption has made possible the development 
of a private equity market. At less than 5 billion dollars in 1980, this market raised more 
than 250 billion dollars in 2006 (Figure 3), providing the source of financing for the 
venture capital and buyout industry.  However, this exemption does not provide any 
scope for security underwriters. The Securities Act prohibits not only the offer, but also 
the resale of any unregistered security unless the seller is “any person other than an 
issuer, underwriter, or dealer.”
6  To help underwriters determine whether they could trade 
a security, the SEC adopted Rule 144 in 1972, which imposes some holding periods for 
resale: six months if the issuer already filed under the Exchange Act, one year otherwise.  
In 1990 the SEC adopted Rule 144A which provides a safe harbor from the 
registration requirements for resale of “non-fungible” restricted securities to “qualified 
institutional buyers” (QIBs) and is designed to to facilitate “a more liquid and efficient 
resale market for unregistered securities.”,.  QIBs are institutions managing investment 
portfolios of $100 million or more. Unlike Rule 144, Rule144A imposes no holding 
period, thereby increasing the liquidity of these securities. 
Since its adoption, Rule 144A has become a very common means by which 
issuers access the institutional capital markets (such as mutual funds, pension funds and 
asset managers). Annual issues of Rule 144A non-convertible debt have increased from 
$3.39 billion in 1990 to $235.17 billion in 1998 (Livingston and Zhou, 2002). For 
international issuers, the volume of 144A debt has grown from $378 million in 1991 to 
$12.1 billion in 1997. More importantly, as a proportion of the total debt issued by 
international firms, 144A issues have grown from 11 percent of the total debt issued in 
1991 to 65 percent in 1997 (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2002).  
Although both equities and bonds can be issued under Rule 144A, in the first ten 
years, the majority of Rule 144A issues were non-convertible debt. For example, of the 
$262 billion of Rule 144A securities issued in 1997, $40.7 billion was equity; $11.2 
billion convertible bonds; and $210.1 billion (or 80%) non-convertible debt (Bethel and 
Sirri, 1998).   
                                                 
6 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(1).   16
  The reason for this difference is that companies whose equity is publicly traded in 
a U.S. market cannot issue equity under rule144A. In recent years, however, and 
especially after Sarbanes-Oxley, the market for 144A equity offerings increased 
dramatically. Initially, it was fueled only by foreign issuers, who preferred to tap the 
United States market without paying the disclosure and compliance costs (Zingales, 
2006).  In 2002, Rule144A offerings were $40 billion, representing only 22% of all the 
equity raised in the United States. In 2006, they had risen to more than $160 billion 
representing more than 50% of the equity raised in the United States (Tang (2007) and 
(Figure 4)).  In particular, foreign companies raised $10.5 billion in publicly registered 
offerings, but under Rule 144A $133 billion equity private placements. 
The importance of the Rule 144A for equity offerings, however, has not remained 
limited to foreign issuers. In May 2007, the 144A market broke new ground when 
Oaktree Capital Management LLC, a leading private U.S. hedge fund advisory firm, sold 
a 15% equity stake in itself for $880 million in a deal structured as a private placement 
under Rule144A (Sjostrom (forthcoming)). Had Oaktree’s offering been structured as an 
IPO, it would have been the sixth largest IPO by a domestic issuer in 2007. According to 
Lambe (2007), the founders of Oaktree stated “that they were happy to sacrifice a little 
public market liquidity, and even take a slightly lower valuation, in return for a less 
onerous regulatory environment and the benefits of remaining private.”  
  What made the offering possible, however, was the contemporaneous creation of 
GSTrUE, Goldman Sachs Tradable Unregistered Equity OTC Market for listing 
unregistered 144A securities. By providing a platform for trading the unregistered 
security, GSTrUE reduced the cost of non-registering with the SEC.    
  Goldman is not alone in seeing big opportunities in the market for unregistered 
securities. In July 2007, Nasdaq, which already had a platform for listing private 
placements, extended its capability to include trading. In August 2007, 
Citigroup Inc., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Morgan Stanley 
and Bank of New York Mellon Corp. established the Open Platform for Unregistered 
Securities. The firms say OPUS-5 "will provide trade reservation, shareholder tracking 
and transfer management for privately offered equity securities." Since then the subprime   17
mortgage crisis has reduced the interest for equity offerings. But the market for non-
registered securities is likely to become increasingly important after the crisis.   
 
2.3 The enhanced role played by capital markets  
  Even at the peak of the 1920s euphoria, only one American household in eight 
owned stock. Today, one in two does. If the past trend (Figure 6) is any indication of the 
future one, this percentage is bound to increase substantially in the future.  
  The purpose of stock investment has also changed dramatically. From a 
speculative activity, stock investing has become one of the major means of asset 
accumulation to finance future retirement needs. As Figure 7 shows, in 1975 pension 
assets accounted for only 18% of GDP; in 2005, they accounted for more than 60%. It is 
not surprising that stock market information abounds both in TV programs and 
newspaper articles, and that the stock market has become an integral part of the life (and 
the welfare) of most Americans.  
  Not only is the average American more exposed to stock market fluctuations, he 
is also asked to make more financial decisions, which will significantly impact his future 
life. In 1975, almost 70% of all pension contributions were “defined benefits,” where the 
employee was offered a predetermined retirement income, shielding him from any 
decision and most risk (Figure 8). In 2005, less than 20% of the overall contribution was 
going to a defined benefit plan, with the rest going to defined contribution plans or 401k 
plans. In both these latter cases, the ultimate investment decision stays with the 
employee, who also bears the full risk.    
  This enormous increase in the exposure to financial market risk was not joined by 
an increase in financial education. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) show that 
only 18 percent of Americans can correctly compute the compound interest over two 
years. Of those who got that interest question wrong, 43 percent undertook a simple 
interest calculation, thereby ignoring the interest accruing on both principal and interest. 
Similarly, Hilgert and Hogarth (2002) show that only 50% of Americans know that 
mutual funds do not pay a guaranteed rate of return and only 56 percent know that “over 
the long-term, stocks have the highest rate of return on money invested.”   18
  This enormous mismatch between the financial literacy needed to make the most 
basic (and necessary) financial planning and the actual literacy possessed by most 
Americans creates three problems. The first problem is the classic one, studied by the 
1930s reformers, of asymmetry of information and knowledge. Whenever financially 
illiterate investors have to make important decisions, the risk of abuses is high and, in the 
view of the 1930s legislators, this called for intense regulation.    
  We could be tempted to dismiss these fears on the basis that competition is the 
strongest form of protection for investors. This faith, however, has weakened in recent 
years. As Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show, in the presence of some limitations in the 
rationality of consumers, competition will not lead to better protection of investors.  
  The last problem associated with the enlarged importance of the stock market in 
the welfare of the average American is the political pressure to intervene. A significant 
drop in the stock market has become a major public policy issue, making it almost 
impossible for the Chairman of the Federal Reserve not to intervene with interest rate 
cuts to try to sustain the level of the stock market. While this problem seems unrelated 
with the need for security regulation, it is not. The anticipation of this intervention creates 
a serious moral hazard problem, which can be limited only by some ex ante regulation.   
 
 
3.  Shortcomings of the current system   
3.1 Evidence that the public market is too heavily regulated  
The explosion of the private equity market in the last twenty-five years suggests that for 
some firms, especially small firms in R&D intensive sectors, disclosure costs are 
substantial. Given the very high hurdle rates venture capitalists and buyout specialists use 
in their valuation, there must be very substantive costs for these firms to access the public 
market. Some of these costs can simply reflect the benefits of staying private, such as the 
more concentrated ownership structure (Jensen, 1989).  But this is not the entire story. 
When Oaktree’s founders chose to go “public” on GSTrUE, it was not to retain a 
concentrated ownership (they could have done it also in an IPO), but to enjoy “a less 
onerous regulatory environment and the benefits of remaining private.”   19
Most worrisome, this preference of businesses to remain (or return) private has 
been increasing in recent years (Zingales, 2006). It is hard to say if this change is due to 
increasing disclosure and compliance costs or decreasing costs of private ownership. 
Both aspects are likely to be true and both point in the direction of an excess gap in the 
cost between public and private ownership.   
This trend is also confirmed by the 144A market for foreign issuers. As 
previously mentioned, foreign issuers have progressively abandoned public listing in the 
United States in favor of 144A offerings. Once again, it is difficult to disentangle whether 
this decision is due to increasing disclosure and compliance costs or to decreasing 
benefits of a U.S. listing vis-à-vis a foreign one. The fact that the biggest competitor of 
the NYSE is not London or Hong Kong, but the 144A market in the United States, 
however, suggests the first hypothesis has some validity (Zingales, 2006).  
Bushee and Leuz (2006), who analyze the economic consequences of a regulatory 
change that requires over-the-counter bulletin board firms to comply with reporting 
requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, find that the imposition of these 
disclosure requirements results in significant costs for smaller firms, forcing them off the 
over the counter bulletin board.  
All this evidence suggests that regulation has its costs, but regulation has its 
benefits too. The same study by Bushee and Leuz (2006) finds that newly compliant 
firms exhibit significant increases in liquidity, consistent with improved disclosure which 
reduces information asymmetry. Benefits of regulation are also identified by the literature 
on cross listing. Both Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) and Hail and Leuz (2006) find 
that firms that cross-list in the United States benefit from this cross-listing because of the 
higher valuation (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007)) or their lower cost of capital (Hail 
and Leuz (2006)).  
Similarly, Livingston and Zhou (2002) find that Rule 144A bond issues have 
higher yields than publicly issued bonds after adjusting for risk. Yield premiums are 
higher if the issuer does not file periodic financial statements with the SEC, suggesting 
that disclosure reduces the cost of capital. 
  While it is difficult to determine empirically whether the cost of regulation 
exceeds the benefits, the delisting of foreign firms, the reduced share of international   20
IPOs captured by the U.S. market, and the increasing tendency of companies to remain 
private all point in the direction of an increase in the cost of public ownership vis-à-vis its 
benefits for an increasing number of firms.   
 
3.2 Evidence that the private market is too lightly regulated  
3.2.1 The CDS Market  
During the last ten years the market for credit default swaps (CDS) grew 
unregulated from almost zero to more than $44 trillion (more than twice the size of the 
U.S. stock market) (Zingales, 2008a). More importantly, the level of collateral posted for 
these contracts was very low or non-existent, generating the possibility of a systemic 
failure. If in the middle of the hurricane season, all of a sudden all Florida homeowners 
lost the insurance for their house, there would be an enormous run to buy new insurance. 
Given that in the short term, insurance capacity is limited, the prices will through to the 
roof. If some homeowners could not afford these prices, their mortgages will 
automatically default, triggering foreclosures and a real estate crisis. This is one of the 
reasons why the insurance market is regulated.  
The same would be true if a large CDS player, like AIG, defaulted. Large 
commercial banks have massive exposure to CDS (Zingales, 2008a). Most of their 
positions are hedged; hence the net exposure is much smaller. Nevertheless, if a major 
player defaults, all the other ones will find themselves un-hedged, triggering a run to buy 
insurance, with consequences not dissimilar from the case described above. In spite of its 
potential systemic effects, the market for CDS is completely unregulated.    
  
3.2.2  The CDO market  
In recent years one of the primary types of securities issued in the 144A market were 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO). To 
price these instruments a good knowledge of the underlying components of these 
structured products. Unfortunately, as Benmelech and Dlugoszb (2008) argue, this 
knowledge is not currently provided, making it difficult to price these assets correctly.  
Since it is in the interest of the buyer to know what he is buying, one might 
wonder why this information was not requested by the buyers to begin with.  A possible   21
explanation is that this information is useful not only to the buyer, but also to the market 
in general. Only if all these securities are transparent their market will be liquid. Each 
buyer, however, takes the liquidity of the market as given and thus does fully internalize 
the benefits of this information. Not internalizing them, buyers will not demand this 
information, even if its aggregate benefits exceed the cost of producing it.      
 
3.2.3  The Hedge funds  
The lack of transparency affects also the hedge fund market. Not knowing what securities 
hedge funds invest in makes it very difficult to determine whether their performance is 
due to ability, excessive risk taking, or luck. This lack of transparency engenders also the 
suspicion that some hedge funds play strategies that are illegal or borderline illegal, 
engaging in insider trading and front running. Finally, lack of transparency makes it 
extremely difficult to evaluate the systemic effects of hedge funds. Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004), for instance, conclude that hedge funds are procyclical, riding the tech 
bubble, but they have to rely on long position only, making their conclusions only 
tentative.      
 
3.2.4 Negative effects of lack of transparency in the private equity market   
  Two of the most convincing indicators of the efficiency of the public equity 
market are the inability of mutual funds to beat the market on average and the lack of 
persistence in their performance. The first indicator also seems to suggest that the private 
equity market is efficient, since Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that, after fees, private 
equity funds are on par with the market. But Kaplan and Schoar (2005) also find a 
significant persistence in the performance of the best funds. They explain this persistence 
in performance with the existence of a scarce talent factor, which is earning a rent. 
However, it is not clear, why these talents should not charge higher fees and clear the 
market, their inability to do so raises doubts on the efficiency of this market.  
  Furthermore, that many of the most successful funds are closed to investors raises 
an important concern. If the best performing funds are not available, then the averages 
calculated in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) do not represent an attainable return. Taking into 
consideration the funds that are not open to investors, a portfolio randomly allocated   22
among private equity funds will perform significantly worse than the S&P with at least 
similar levels of risk. If this is the case, the private equity market attracts a vast amount to 
resources that are wasted, since they are invested at a return inferior to their opportunity 
cost.  
The lack of transparency and public scrutiny in the private equity market can also 
be the cause of abuses and inefficient contracting. As it is clearly stated in some of the 
Harvard cases (e.g, Sahlman and Janower, 1995), some venture capitalists receive 
compensation not only from their investors (in the form of a management fee and carried 
interest), but also from the companies they invest in. Some of these compensations are 
contingent on their using the Venture Capital Fund’s money to finance the company 
(Sahlman and Janower, 1995). These types of contracts do not seem to achieve any useful 
purpose except making the venture capitalist richer, yet create serious moral hazard 
problems. Therefore, one would expect them to be contractually banned and, in fact, an 
increasing number of private equity fund bylaws expressly prohibit them. Nevertheless, 
this ban is not universal. It is difficult for institutions to impose these restrictions on very 
successful VCs. One could conclude that this is simply one extra form of compensation 
for the VC. But the fact that this compensation is extracted in a very inefficient way casts 
doubt on this interpretation and, more generally, on this market where disclosure is not 
mandatory.  
  Finally, in the private equity market there are different ways to aggregate the IRR 
of individual investments into the IRR of a portfolio. These methods lead to significantly 
different results, depending on the timing of the more successful investments. By making 
a direct comparison among funds more difficult, these differences in standards biases the 
process of capital allocation toward the more talented managers. Interestingly, this 
problem persists in spite of the relative sophistication of the players in this industry 
(endowments, pension funds, and very wealthy individuals).  
 
3.4 A Road Map for a Reform of Security Regulation 
In 1933, security regulation was introduced to restore trust in financial markets and bring 
back to public securities investors who had been scarred and scared by the large losses 
suffered in the early 1930s.  Seventy-five years later, we find ourselves in a similar   23
situation. In order to restore trust in the public securities market that most people have 
lost, a new wave of security regulation should be passed. The world, however, has 
changed and the focus of this new security regulation should also change. The type of 
concerns that afflicted investors in the 1920s (lack of transparency and market 
manipulation) are not at the forefront of their concerns today. In part, this is the result of 
the success of the 1930s legislation in addressing those problems. However, this is also in 
part the result of the changes in the security industry described in Section 2. For this 
reason, the same goal--restoring trust—should be achieved with different means.  In light 
of the theoretical discussion in Section 1 and the empirical evidence in Section 2 and 3, 
the reform of security regulation should proceed in three directions: improvement in 
corporate governance; protection of unsophisticated investors; and reduction of the 
regulation gap between public and private markets. 
 
4. Corporate Governance   
While in the 1920s the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by 
offerings of securities of dubious quality and by market manipulators, in the new 
millennium investors’ perception is that they have been defrauded by managers who are 
not accountable to anyone. Scandals like Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia were 
egregious examples of lax corporate governance and managerial enrichment at 
shareholders’ expense. In the same way, the 2007-8 financial crisis is perceived as a 
manifestation of excessive risk taking by managers who were enriching themselves with 
short term bonuses, while destroying the long term value of their companies (ACCA, 
2008). And the stunning collapse of major financial institutions is perceived as the result 
of lack of proper risk management and accountability by corporate boards (Minow, 
2008).  
  In 1933, the political response to the generalized mistrust toward the stock market 
was the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, which increased 
disclosure and reduced the opportunity for stock market manipulation, and the Glass 
Steagall act, which reduced the conflict of interest between investors and security 
underwriters by separating commercial banks and investment banks. Regardless of   24
whether the original perception was correct, its existence justified a political response to 
reassure investors.  
4.1 The need for a political response  
  In the current scenario disclosure is not the issue and public concerns will not be 
relieved only by increasing disclosure. While popular, actions directly aimed at curbing 
managerial compensations would be completely useless if not counterproductive, just as 
the 1992 Clinton initiative to curb managerial compensation had the opposite effect. The 
maximum fixed compensation that was tax deductible became the standard, and the 
variable components exploded.  
The real issue is the lack of accountability of managers to shareholders, centered 
in the way corporate boards are elected. For example what if the U.S. political system 
meant that candidates standing up for election could only be proposed by the current 
executive and could be elected even if they do not obtain the majority of the votes? 
Unfortunately, this Soviet-like system is the current election system of U.S. corporate 
boards. This is the primary reason for the lack of accountability and it is the place where 
reform should start.  
 
4.2 The Need to Grant Shareholders Access to Proxy  
  Disclosure is insufficient to address this governance issue because of the well-
known collective action problem. However, the increased institutionalization of equity 
ownership provides a simple way to alleviate this problem: allowing shareholders access 
to the proxy ballot. A year ago in response to the SEC proposal to grant shareholders’ 
access to proxy, the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, Katz, famous for its anti-
shareholders’ right stand, wrote  “No real-world crisis has shown that the current system 
needs radical revision. Five years after Enron and WorldCom, the capital markets are 
well into a cycle of unprecedented vigor” (Wachtell et al, 2007).  Unfortunately, the crisis 
has arrived and this crisis does show that the current system is in need of revisions.    
In the current system, except in the case of hostile takeovers (which are extremely 
rare now) boards are self-perpetuating entities that are not accountable to anyone.  As 
long as future board members can only be nominated by the current board, where the 
executives hold large sway, the reputation incentives, which Fama and Jensen (1983)   25
theorize should align directors’ incentives with those of shareholders. Board members 
owe their loyalty to management who directly or indirectly appoint them and have no 
incentive to dissent, since dissention runs the risk of being punished with exclusion. Even 
independent directors, often acclaimed as the solution to all the problems, are subject to 
the same pressure. To break this state of affairs it is necessary to allow institutional 
investors to propose their own slate of directors. The possibility of being elected (and 
turned down) in a real election will naturally make board members accountable to 
shareholders, indirectly also making the executives accountable.  
This very simple proposal has been criticized along three dimensions (Wachtell et 
al, 2007). The first is that it will Balkanize boards, creating a tension between directors 
and producing little inefficient parliaments. Unlike parliaments, however, corporate 
boards’ primary function is not to redistribute resources but to create them. Unlike 
parliaments, corporate boards have to compete in the marketplace and live under the 
constant monitoring of the stock market, which promptly punishes inefficient decision-
making. Thus, the problem in corporate boards is the opposite to that of parliaments: 
social pressure to conform that can lead to what Jarvis (1972) define as groupthink, a 
well-known phenomenon that leads groups to make mistakes none of the individual 
participants would have made alone.  
The second objection is that empowering shareholders will lead to excessive short 
–termism by corporate boards. According to this self-serving view, executives have the 
long-term interest of their corporation at heart, while shareholders, who can trade in and 
out, are only interested in the short term results. While popular, I do not know of any 
empirical support for this view. To the contrary, Aghion, Van Reenan and Zingales 
(2008) show that higher institutional investors’ ownership increases innovation 
(measured as cite-weighted patents). To the contrary, the primary reason for a short-term 
bias in corporate America is precisely the lack of accountability for corporate boards. 
Dictatorial regimes, like the Chinese one, are extremely sensitive to the popular mood 
because this is the only form of political feedback and the only way in which political 
dissatisfaction can manifest itself and possibly subvert the existing power structure. In the 
same way, corporate boards captured by managers are extremely sensitive to stock prices,   26
because that is the only way in which shareholders’ dissent can manifest itself and 
possibly overturn the CEO. The role of the board is not to blindly follow stock prices, but 
to create value for shareholders, exploiting the informational advantage they have. In 
other words, a board that is legitimated can more easily resist an unjustified stock market 
pressure than a board that is not. 
The third objection is that allowing shareholders to nominate directors can 
empower shareholders who do not have the interest of the corporation at heart, but place 
some different self-serving agenda as a priority. This is a distinct possibility. If the GM 
pension fund, for instance, have some say in the election of banks’ directors it could 
appoint directors who have the interest of GM more at heart than the interest of their 
bank. Although this is true, it is not different from the current scenario where several 
board members are executives in other companies. Furthermore, this risk can be 
minimized, if not eliminated, by restricting the set of investors who have access to proxy. 
For example, we can restrict the ability to nominate directors to institutional investors 
who satisfy some criteria of independence and can prove to have held the stock for a 
minimum amount of time. Last but not least, this possibility has been in place in the U.K. 
for a long time and has been recently introduced in Italy. While we can argue about its 
effectiveness, there is no evidence that the stated concerns have any foundation (Zingales, 
2008b).   
4.3 A Glass Steagall Act for Institutional Investors   
An important component of the New Deal legislation was the Glass-Steagall Act, 
which separated investment and commercial banking. The purpose of this act was to 
eliminate the conflict of interest between the intermediaries financing companies and the 
ones placing these securities in the hands of investors. The fear was that commercial 
banks would dump on investors the bonds of companies that they knew (because they 
were the main lenders) were about to default. While some scholars doubt that this was a 
serious conflict of interest (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994) and that such a law was necessary 
to resolve it (Kroszner and Rajan, 1997), at the time it was considered essential to 
restoring the trust of the market in security underwriting.    27
In the current situation, where the major problem is corporate governance, the 
most pernicious conflict of interest is the one tying money managers and corporate 
managers. To the extent money managers are tied to investment and commercial banks, 
they depend on corporate managers for business and so they are unlikely to take a critical 
position in the corporate governance arena. Even the mutual funds companies that are 
independent, such as Vanguard or Fidelity, market their services to corporate pension 
funds and thus are unlikely to confront the managers who appoint the person in charge to 
decide which family to choose. Cohen and Schmidt (2008) show evidence that mutual 
funds even tilt their portfolio in favor of the sponsors of these plans in order to please 
them.   
  To eliminate these conflicts, two steps are in order. The first one is to remove the 
control over the decision of 401(k) and defined contribution plans from the hands of 
corporate managers. It would suffice that these choices be made by an elected 
representative of the beneficiaries, rather than by a corporate manager.  
The second, more difficult, problem deals with the separation of the investment 
banking activity from the money managing activity, especially the mutual fund activity. 
Besides freeing portfolio managers from their need to cater to corporate managers, this 
separation would be beneficial from two other points of view. It would reduce the 
conflict of interest in the distribution sector, further enhancing investor protection  at the 
entry phase. Under the current regime brokers generally sell to customers some financial 
products created by their own company and some financial products that are created by 
other companies. As I will discuss in the next section, the protection of unsophisticated 
investors requires that the broker discloses up front the differences in commissions he 
receives from the different companies. However, if the program is an internal one, the 
commission can be easily disguised. For example, the broker can receive a discretionary 
bonus at the end of the year which is linked to the amount of investment he diverted to in-
house funds, without ever making this benefit explicit. Hence, full transparency does 
require a separation between distribution and money management activity.       
  Finally, the separation between investment banking activity and money 
management activity would eliminate potential risks of insider trading. Currently, these 
risks are contained with internal Chinese walls. But as the very experience of China   28
suggests, Chinese walls often fail in their intent as a result of human fragility. The formal 
separation will eliminate even these problems.     
5. Protection of unsophisticated investors 
For the vast majority of individuals, owning individual stock instead of mutual 
funds provides no benefits, while it might have some real costs. It provides no benefits 
because with the enormous number of specialized mutual funds and ETFs an individual 
can invest in any sector he wants and can hedge any need he might have, without 
resorting to individual securities. The level of idiosyncratic risk at which an individual 
can be exposed by buying single stocks is very high and dangerous. For well-educated 
individuals, who consciously assume this risk, this is not a problem. But for the large 
fraction of Americans, who cannot tell that whether a single stock is more risky than a 
mutual fund, this is a problem.  
While the goal to prevent unsophisticated households from investing directly in 
security markets is a laudable one, it is probably not achievable, at least not at reasonable 
costs. One possibility would be to introduce a test to qualify individuals for the direct 
purchase of securities. Individuals who do not pass the test will only be able to invest 
through mutual funds. The problem with this solution is twofold. First, on the one hand it 
would be unfair to keep the Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) off the table. On the other 
hand, many ETF, which use leverage, are much more risky than individual securities. 
Thus, any dividing line would be very arbitrary. Second, if the test is not truly 
discriminating, then it is not worth having. If it is discriminating and it prevents willing 
buyers from participating in the market, the finance industry will create many securities 
targeted to bypass this restriction. Hence, such regulation would be both costly and 
ineffective.   
At the end of the day, the more effective (and least costly) solution would be to 
have regulation that dissuades (rather than prevent) unsophisticated households from 
investing directly in security markets. As the investment prospectus of any mutual fund 
contains the statement “past performance is not an indication of future performance,” any 
broker contract should contain a statement to the effect that buying securities directly is 
dangerous and should be avoided by all, but the most sophisticated investors.    29
While the effectiveness of this approach might be limited, its implementation has 
several advantages. First, it would make it more difficult for brokers to bully investors 
into purchasing securities he or she might not be comfortable purchasing.  Second, it 
would make it politically feasible to lighten some of the more burdensome regulation, 
attracting more companies to the security market. If “widows and orphans” are 
discouraged from investing in the market directly, there is no justification for security 
regulation specifically aimed at protecting them. Finally, it would focus regulatory 
attention where attention should be focused, i.e., on the mutual fund industry and, more 
generally, the asset management industry, where unsophisticated investors access 
financial markets.  
All the attention that the 1933 security legislation put into protecting investors 
from abuses in underwriting and trading securities should be directed to protect investors 
in their access to financial markets. In this case the degree of protection should be even 
stronger. While most investors in the 1930s were relatively rich and thus presumably well 
educated and better able to fend for themselves, the expansion of 401(k) and defined 
contribution plans have forced millions  of uneducated and unsophisticated investors to 
make financial decisions.  
5.1 The problems in the mutual fund industry  
  This lack of sophistication creates three problems in the mutual fund industry. 
The first problem is what Jackson (2008) calls the “trilateral dilemma”: mutual funds get 
paid to divert their trade toward some brokers (not necessarily the cheapest ones) and 
pension consultants, who advise employer sponsors on the selection of investment 
options, get paid by financial service firms offering 401(k) programs.    
The second is the total level of the fees. The SEC (2000) finds that the average 
mutual fund expense ratio rose from 1.14% of assets in 1979 to 1.36% in 1999, despite 
the growth in average fund size. Even very homogenous products, such as funds that 
track the S&P 500, have a high dispersion in fees. The 75
th percentile by cost is 3.1 times 
that of the 25
th percentile (Hortacsu and Syverson, 2003). If we exclude sales loads and 
other sale-related fees, the fees in this category of funds vary between 8 and 85 basis 
points. This induces some commentators (e.g., Mahoney (2004)) to raise the question 
whether the real scandal is the total size of the fees.     30
In general, we think that competition takes care of this problem. But in the mutual 
fund industry there are three reasons why this is not necessarily the case. First, roughly 
40 percent of funds are sold through employer-sponsored retirement plans. Employers 
generally pick one or two fund families to offer to their employees. Hence, funds happily 
use 12b-1 fees (i.e., shareholders’ money) to compete for employers’ business, knowing 
that employees will then become captive customers.  Second, in mutual funds ordinary 
investors cannot benefit from the monitoring performed by smart investors. When the 
managers of normal corporations misbehave, smart investors cannot withdraw their 
money, hence they sell the company’s stock. This creates downward pressure in the stock 
price. Lower stock prices affect managers directly (through their holdings of stock and 
options) and indirectly (affecting the probability of takeovers). In mutual funds nothing 
like that happens. When managers misbehave, smart investors withdraw their money and 
ordinary uninformed investors stay in. Paradoxically, this gives mutual fund managers 
the perverse incentive to behave even more opportunistically. Once they have lost their 
price-sensitive clientele, they can start increasing fees without losing assets under 
management. The Steadman Fund, also called the dead-men fund, is a very famous 
example of this situation (Goldberg1999). In spite of grossly underperforming the market 
every year, this fund continues to increase its management fee, because it knows the 
investors it has left are not paying attention to the change (possibly many are estates of 
deceased people, hence its nickname).  
The third is the possibility of abuses which cannot be easily deterred by lawsuits 
because mutual fund companies manage a disproportionate amount of assets with respect 
to their net wealth and hence they can cause damages far in excess of their capital. 
Zitzewitz (2003) estimates the cost of market timing to buy-and-hold investors is about 
$5 billion a year. Late trading is adding another $400 million to that figure. Given the 
magnitude of the losses, investors’ hope of recovering them through lawsuits is limited. 
 
 5.2 Possible solutions 
The case to mandate better disclosure is simple. However, given the 
unsophisticated nature of mutual fund investors, even the format of this disclosure and 
the timing can make a difference. Investors should be provided—before  they make their   31
purchase—a dollar estimate of all the expenses charged to their investment, including the 
amount paid in trading commissions, broken down in commissions paid for trading and 
commissions paid for services.  Since the clerical cost of these disclosures is small, it is 
very difficult to argue against making them mandatory.  
Similarly, at the time of the purchase, brokers should disclose the fee they receive 
on the different products they sell, including the “soft dollar” they receive in the form of 
higher trading costs.     
While the case for mandatory disclosure is simple, the case for other forms of 
regulation is not. Given the size of the assets under management, it is difficult to fight 
potential frauds and abuses through higher capital requirements and mandatory insurance. 
They would be too expensive and would create big barriers to entry.  Hence, there is the 
need to increase the amount of monitoring.     
Competition among different enforcement authorities can help monitor the funds 
more closely. When the SEC had become too complacent, possibly due to the effect of 
regulatory capture, it was the General Attorney from New York State, Eliot Spitzer, who 
took the lead in the fight against frauds. 
A more delicate topic is whether to take a more paternalistic view toward 
investors who seem to behave in an uninformed or irrational way.  At the very least, there 
is a strong case to apply some version of the “libertarian paternalism” à la Thaler and 
Sustein (2003), by introducing default options that favor low-cost indexed funds. For 
example, it could be required that every 401(k) plan contains at least one low-cost index 
fund, which should be the default option for investors, unless they specify otherwise.  
 
6.  Reduce the public-private cost gap 
As I discussed in Sections 2 and 3, the 1933-34 security regulation de facto lead to a two-
tier system with a heavily regulated public market and a completely unregulated private 
one. This system is neither the result of a rational design, nor the natural outcome of 
competitive pressures, as free competition in security regulation à la Romano (1998) 
would deliver. Rather, it is the result of progressive holes in the original architecture of 
the New Deal Legislation that have been opened by industry lobbying. These holes are   32
not necessarily bad, since they do create flexibility in the system, but there should be no 
presumption of optimality. 
  Hence, in rethinking this structure we need to address two questions: 1) is a two-
tier (or multiple tiers) system optimal? 2) is the distinction between these tiers set at the 
optimal level?   
  The answer to the first question is probably affirmative. On the one hand, 
disclosure is costly and there is no reason why all companies should be forced to have the 
same level of disclosure. On the other hand, there are benefits of a fairly standardized 
system. Having a ten-tier market will probably confuse investors and reduce the liquidity 
of each of these markets. The multitude of tiers will also increase the signaling effect that 
belonging to a superior tier has. The use of a higher regulated tier as a signal of quality 
would force a lot of companies into inefficiently high regulation to separate themselves 
from the rest. Thus, while there is not a strong theoretical argument in favor of a two 
versus a three or four tier system, the current division in two segments seems reasonable.   
  What needs to be rethought is the distance between these tiers. The analysis in 
Section 3 suggests that this distance might be too far, since the unregulated market is 
constantly gaining ground over the regulated one. The same analysis, however, suggests 
that this distance should not be reduced by only decreasing regulation in the upper tier, 
but also by increasing some regulation in the lower one.  
  
6.1 Some New Rules for the Private Market  
 
Enhanced prospectuses  
  The experience with the CDO and RMBS market, where trillion of dollars in 
securities were issued in the 144A market without the proper amount of transparency, 
forces us to rethink the current regulation. While QIBs are able to fend for themselves in 
this market, they are unlikely to internalize the systemic effects these securities might 
have. As a result, a case can be made for some form of mandatory disclosure even in this 
market. But since disclosure is not costless, the problem is where to draw the line. A 
regulation based on the amount of security offered would be useless because it can be 
easily overcome by breaking an issue in separate tranches of smaller size. The problem of   33
the mortgage-backed security was not the size of each individual offering, but the 
aggregate size of mortgage backed securities.      
  The only solution is to empower a regulatory authority, be it the SEC or the Fed, 
to mandate enhanced disclosure when a set of securities become sufficiently important to 
have potential systemic effects.  
 
Forced transparency of “systemic” markets  
Following the same logic, the SEC or the Fed should have the right to move to an 
organized exchange derivative contracts that reach a sufficient size to have potential 
systemic effects.  
As previously discussed, the CDS market was able to grow—unregulated—to a 
size twice the entire U.S. stock market, creating important systemic effects (Zingales, 
2008b).  More importantly, the level of collateral posted for these contracts was very low 
or non-existent, generating the possibility of a systemic failure. As the Federal Reserve 
has the right to establish margin requirements for stock purchases, it should also have the 
right to set the margin requirements for these contracts.    
 
Standardization in reporting and delayed transparency  
As discussed in Section 3, the lack of information in the private equity market can 
lead to misallocation of resources. These shortcomings can be easily addressed at very 
little cost for the issuers. The first requirement would be to standardize reporting for 
private equity funds and hedge funds above a certain size. A common set of standards, 
like how to calculate the internal rate of return, how much information disclose on the 
past investments, etc., can be imposed with very little cost to the issuer, but great benefits 
to the investors. In particular, it would be useful if the buyout fund specified the financial 
structure of the companies they invest in to compute the amount of risk they assume.  
A more delicate question is how much disclosure to impose on private equity 
funds and hedge funds with regard to the composition of their portfolio. The reason why 
it is delicate is that there are significant competitive issues at stake. Portfolio strategies 
are the main source of comparative advantage for a hedge fund and better funds will be 
heavily penalized if forced to report them.    34
For this reason, I propose a delayed disclosure in which private companies and 
unregistered funds disclose their portfolio composition and their performance with a 1 to 
2 year delay. This delay will eliminate any competitive concern, since the half life of 
portfolio strategy is very short on Wall Street, while still providing the benefit of a 
serious statistical analysis of this market, which will improve allocation.    
This delayed disclosure should be imposed to all the funds (above a minimum 
size) that raise capital in the United States. For very large funds, there will be a need for 
contemporaneous disclosure only to the regulatory authorities, which will keep them 
confidential, for systemic considerations.  
 
6.2 Deregulation of the Public Market    
The several changes proposed above will make it easier to lighten the regulatory burden 
for publicly-traded companies. Since the prospectuses will be aimed at institutions and 
not to individual investors, they can be substantially reduced in size, without 
compromising substance. There is no reason, for instance, to remind institutional 
investors of all the risks of investing in the initial public offering of a small company.  
The caveat emptor should apply. This and similar simplifications could cut down on the 
size of the prospectuses and the costs of disclosure, giving the opportunity to improve the 
quality of the substantive disclosure.  
The presumption of operating in a market of sophisticated investors will also 
allow companies more flexibility. For example, companies could be allowed to opt out of 
the current litigation system in favor of an arbitration system at the IPO as proposed by 
the Committee on Capital Market Regulation (2006).   
Finally, the shareholders’ empowerment proposed in Section 5 would make a lot 
of the existing regulation redundant, at least in its mandatory form. For example, the 
presence of institutional investors’ representative on the board would make it possible to 
transform many mandatory provisions, including Sarbanes-Oxley, into “British-style” 
comply-or-explain provisions.  
 
5. Conclusions   35
 In 1933, security regulation was introduced to restore trust in financial markets after the 
dramatic losses suffered in the early 1930s.  Seventy-five years later, we find ourselves in 
a similar situation. In order to restore the trust in the public securities market that most 
people have lost, a new set of rules should be passed. However, the nature of these rules 
should be very different from that of the 1930s. While in the 1920s, the prevailing 
perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious quality 
securities, in the new millennium, investors’ perception is that they have been defrauded 
by managers who are not accountable to anyone.  
  The first set of new rules, thus, should reform the current corporate governance 
regime, empowering institutional investors to nominate their own directors to the board. 
To protect the independence of these institutional investors, it is necessary to pass a sort 
of Glass-Steagall Act that separates investment and commercial banking from mutual 
fund management.  
  The second set of reforms should be aimed at protecting unsophisticated investors 
when they approach financial markets. Institutional investors should be discouraged from 
investing in individual security, but should be heavily protected in their investment in 
mutual funds not only through aggressive disclosure, but also with rule aimed at 
enhancing competition among funds and reducing their fees.  
   The third set of reforms should be aimed at reducing (while not eliminating) the 
current regulatory gap between public and private equity markets, reducing regulation in 
the public market some while increasing regulation in the private ones.   
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Figure 8: Relative importance of defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, 
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